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Intellectual Property Rights in Japan - Has Anything Really Changed?
IPR Importance Has Increased
Worldwide enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) has become a major issue in
the last decade of the twentieth century. Piracy is not new, of course. Forty years ago,
graduate students could order photocopied pirated texts from Taiwan for a tenth the price
in a bookstore, and the ubiquity of the photocopier has even made "piracy" of currency,
a.k.a. counterfeiting, a cottage industry. Nevertheless, the increasing value of intellectual
property, whether it be of inventions, trade secrets, or programs, as well as of copyright
material available on the world wide web, combined with the increasing availability of
copying technologies that make the Xerox machine's limitations even more evident, has
brought the issues of IPR to the forefront. Indeed, the question of protecting an
enterprise's intellectual property is approaching the same importance in an enterprise's
selecting manufacturing and development sites as taxes and wage rates.
There are many dimensions to protecting intellectual property, ranging from never
introducing valuable IP into an economy where rights are not recognized and protected to
mounting a rigorous program of patenting and copyrighting everything valuable,
including the identification and protection of genuine trade secrets. As it happens, IP is in
danger everywhere in the world. Indeed, it is in the US that software piracy losses are
believed to be by far the largest, although - in contrast - in Russia and China, among
others, virtually all business software is believed to be pirated. On the other hand, in the
US, as in most of Western Europe, legal protections for IP are strong, and the penalties
for misappropriation are not only substantial, they are enforceable and enforced.
Nevertheless, a patent is expensive even where it is not valuable, and one of the first
questions to be answered in an IPR protection program is "where to file for a patent".
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Where File for a Patent
The factors affecting where one should file for a patent are straightforward. Where will
any product be manufactured, and where it will be sold. Where the competitors are
currently doing business, and where they may do it in the future. Where is infringement
likely, and where might there be opportunities to license the patent. How many patents in
that field you already have, and how good they are. And, since a patent costs real money,
both to obtain and to maintain, the budget is a final hurdle. No less important, though, is
whether the patents will be enforced by local authorities and, if they are infringed, will
appropriate damages be assessed. In the final analysis, these factors will dominate, often
leading to a decision not only to desist from patenting, but also not to establish certain
kinds of businesses if the IPR climate is not satisfactory.
In contrast, we are also seeing a trend in which countries in which "intellectual property"
was for decades an oxymoron are joining the United States and Western Europe as strong
advocates of protecting the rights of creators and owners of intellectual property. Japan
is a case in point, as in so many issues probably the leading example of this trend. A
recent workshop sponsored by the MIT Japan Program in Cambridge focused on the
current status of intellectual property in Japan and Southeast Asia, posing the question,
"Has Anything Changed?" The consensus of the attendees was that, in Japan, at least,
things are definitely changing, although perhaps less in reality (honne) than in
appearances (tatemae). Not only are Japanese laws and regulations being changed, but it
further appears that the attitudes of both government bureaucrats and industrial leaders
are changing.
Worldwide Piracy Statistics
The statistics on piracy are staggering (if in many cases based on estimates). For
example, in 1997, worldwide software piracy losses (programs that were used but not
paid for) totaled some $11.4B. Americans should not be sanguine about these numbers.
Although much of the stolen software, probably most of it, was stolen from American
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owners, some $2.7B of the total, by far the largest portion, was stolen here in the USA.
23% of the software, 43% of the business software, was stolen. In China, it was estimated
that 96% of the software was pirated, totaling about $1.4B. The total for Asia came to
$3.9B. Eastern Europe, too, saw far more software stolen than paid for; except in
countries eager to join the EC and NATO, the piracy rate neared 100%: 89% in Russia,
93% in Bulgaria.
Estimates for piracy of movies are not as precise, but a recent article suggested that
virtually all of the home videos seen in China are pirated, distributed on inexpensive
minidisks. It would be a formidable task to even guess at the losses from patent
infringement and theft of trade secrets. To sum up the situation, a list of countries with
serious IPR problems would look like the United Nations, with the notable absence of the
EC, Japan, Taiwan, the US, and Canada (and, perhaps, a number of countries where there
is neither a large GDP nor a significant presence of foreign business).
Countries with IPR problems are small (Israel and Singapore) and large; Muslim
(Pakistan and Indonesia) and Christian (Mexico and Brazil), both emerging and mature
economically, former US allies and antagonists. What clearly characterizes these
countries, however, is that they are predominantly consumers of intellectual property
rather than creators and owners. The interests of the native consumers are aligned with
those of native entrepreneurs and, consequently, with those of the government. In the
near term, barring strong external pressure, everyone benefits from piracy. Japan used to
be just like the rest, with the powerful government bureaucrats working closely with
business interests to ensure that Japanese companies were not prevented from succeeding
because of a lack of patents or copyrights. In a famous instance, MITI leveraged IBM's
insistence on owning 100% of IBM Japan into securing a license on all of IBM's
information handling patents.
In a more notorious case, IP "piracy" became grand theft in 1982, when in an FBI sting
Hitachi engineers and executives were caught red-handed stealing hard disk hardware
from an IBM plant. Today, as we shall see, such dealings are much more businesslike,
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with legally enforceable licenses and technology transfers enabling both parties in such a
transaction to come out ahead.
Has "Japan, Inc." Targeted US Research and Innovation?
The stunning success of the Japanese economy in the late 1980's sent mixed signals to
the US government. Should the US copy some of the Japanese practices and institute
government-mediated industry, an "industrial policy"? Should US companies band
together in keiretsu-like families? Should antitrust laws be amended to shelter some
presumably useful cartels? No wholesale changes were made and, as the Japanese
economy sagged in the 1990's, it became clear that a major cause of Japanese success
had been the negative cost of capital in the 1980's, triggered by the (in)famous Plaza
Accord of 1985.
Nevertheless, many American politicians did not understand why Japan had succeeded,
and why the US, in comparison, had lagged. In a situation somewhat akin to the debate
over whether the USSR could have developed an atomic bomb without assistance from
spies and fellow travelers, some politicians loudly claimed that the Japanese had
succeeded because they were freeloaders, exploiting American innovation. Worse, they
were exploiting American innovation that had been paid for with federal funding. This
made good press copy, and eventually led to a Senate investigation.
The investigation focused on such observable facts as the number of Japanese graduate
students at prestigious American institutions (virtually all paid for by either their
employer or the government) and the number of professorships endowed by major
Japanese companies at schools like MIT. These numbers were then related to Japanese
commercial successes that had been based on US taxpayer funded academic research.
The problem the investigators eventually faced, however, was the gap between
"innovation" and "commercialization". It was generally conceded that Japanese
inventions were not as fundamental, were not as valuable in the long term, as American
inventions. However, the time and money needed to commercialize many important
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inventions were not acceptable to American companies with a quarter to quarter earnings
measurement. The Japanese, however, had been willing to make those investments, and
their commercial success was only a fitting reward for the risks they took.
The committee also explored the possibility of locking up the American innovations. This
was eventually seen to entail unacceptable costs. The main problem was that the Japanese
companies were not "stealing" anything; they were taking university research that was by
intent in the public domain. The primary engine driving most university research, in fact,
is the idea that it will be published, and public. Even the publication delays that some
institutions are agreeing to in return for substantial research grants are not easy to accept,
and any formal prohibition on publication or transfer was viewed as a major imposition
on academic freedom. Besides, it was argued, the know-how is surely going to move with
the students, and there was no acceptable way to keep them from coming, learning, and
going back.
The verdict, in this case, was "innocent."
Japanese Attitudes Are Changing
Now, however, we can read in the Yomiuri newspaper that the Japanese "Government to
bolster steps against product piracy" by others in Southeast Asia from Japanese
companies. And one might surmise that these steps are more than just for show. Led by
the interests of their largest and most successful companies, MITI and other Japanese
government agencies have joined the "haves". When seven of the ten companies
receiving the most US patents are Japanese, and Japanese companies have major
ownership interests in the largest movie studios and distributors of CD's, it can hardly be
a surprise that protecting IPR has become a major priority for Japan.
To a limited extent, this is not entirely new. A 1991 Fujitsu publication, for example,
stated that "R&D strategy and patent strategy are fundamentally and closely linked".
Fujitsu and other Japanese companies have for a long time given their new hire engineers
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substantial formal training in patents, as well as giving them three to six month
assignments in the patent department, reading and reviewing competitive patents. Fujitsu
literature states that (in my translation) "Use of the patent system grasps the essential
problems of the technology development business". What Fujitsu management did not
grasp at the time, however, was the utility inherent in offensive use of their large patent
portfolio.
A cursory comparison of patents in Japan and the US indicates how far they have to go
even now. In Japan, it takes twice as long to get a patent (36-48 months) as it does in the
US. The average cost for filing and defending the application is twice the US cost.
Maintenance costs are higher than in the US, and increase with time. In 1996 the
Japanese Patent Office received 4.5 million applications, while the US Patent Office
received 960 thousand. In 1994, Japanese Universities received 124 Japanese patents
while US universities received 1862 US patents. The average Japanese award for
damages from infringement was $383K while in the US it was $92M. Evidently, it is
time for a change.
A major factor that will contribute to the smoothness of any transition is the recently
enacted "financial big bang." Although much less of a bang than advertised, the new
trend to openness will make international competitiveness much more important for
many Japanese companies. At the same time, financial transactions will be freer, less
subject to MITI intervention and manipulation. Thus, companies that join in the
international licensing game will be freer to do so abroad, and less subject to limitations
at home.
In China, Nothing New
One can contrast this with the situation in China. A key aspect of the Chinese IPR
environment is the lack of firm "rule of law". Even where the interests of the central
government are paramount, and favored enterprises are protected in various ways, the
provincial governments, with different agendas and different priorities, can and do
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promote what we see as piracy. The government has enacted legislation that superficially
makes Chinese patent and copyright law similar to that in the West and Japan. However,
the lack of consistent interpretation, much less enforcement, of these laws means that, at
least for the present, they are paper tigers. For the foreseeable future, protecting the rights
supposedly granted with a patent, the right to prevent someone else from practicing one's
invention, is moot. People applying for Chinese patents do so in the hope, if not
expectation, that China, too, will sooner or later (presumably before the patents expire)
begin to enforce its IPR.
Ingredients of a Healthy Patent Environment
The success of a patent law that will fulfill the intention stated in the US constitution to
"promote the progress of science and useful arts" requires a number of elements. The
patent must teach the invention well enough so that one reasonably skilled in the art can
practice it. Patents must be for useful, novel, non-obvious inventions. This requires a
trained team of examiners, applying a consistent body of practice and case law. It
demands a forum in which a questionable patent can be challenged, or reaffirmed. Where
rights are infringed, damages commensurate with the loss need to be levied and collected.
Trade secrets, too, must be protected, and penalties for misuse of copyright material, as
for patents, must suit the harm. All of these needs, as exemplified by US IP law, are
intended to reward innovators and creators, to assure them the fruits of their creativity.
Japan still has a lot to do in order to meet all these tests. As only one important example,
there is virtually no legal protection for trade secrets. In China, however, almost none of
them hold. Patents can be granted by a province, with no coordination necessary with the
central patent office. They need not be novel. Indeed, a province might grant a patent to a
local enterprise on a product already in production in another province in order to protect
the local company. Damages are extremely rare, and it is widely felt that a trade secret
brought into China might just as well be published in the local newspaper. Obviously,
there are other benefits in doing business in China, and the dearth of IPR protection has
not yet slowed China's explosive growth and the rush of foreign companies to do
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business there. A consideration of the changes now under way in the Japanese IPR
environment may indicate what we can help encourage China to do in order to make for a
more uniform worldwide IPR environment.
Japan - A Manufacturing Mind-Set
Since the Meiji Restoration of the late nineteenth century and Japan's rise as a world
power, the Japanese economy has been based on manufacturing value add. Always short
of natural resources, modern Japan has combined an educated, hard working, disciplined
work force with superb trading skills to achieve its current position. Unable to export
either foodstuffs or natural resources, Japan first exported labor, like most third world
economies, but was able, in a remarkably short period, to convert to an exporter of
finished goods. Isolated by its language and writing system, and insulated from Western
culture for hundreds of years by self-imposed isolation, there was little opportunity for
the creation or consumption of Western drama, music, or literature other than in
translation. Thus, the Japanese were well justified in concluding that their most valuable
intellectual property (even more than that of nineteenth century England) lay in its
manufacturing know-how and secrets.
Thus, not only is Japan's modern economy based on manufacturing, it is led by
executives with manufacturing experience. Even research and development, as critical to
product success in Japan as elsewhere, have been under the management of the "works"
manager in most cases. Development is the servant of production. The "way of making"
is the core competence. A company might tell a stranger its product plans, or pricing or
profit targets, with little compunction. On the other hand, a plant tour would be likely to
consist of little more than an hour or two in a conference room, with lots of tea and small
talk, but little "touring".
Japanese Patenting Background
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Even the Japanese patenting practice was shaped by this mold. Japanese patent law
encouraged relatively few, narrow claims in a patent, thus catering to incremental
improvements in a product or process. The time to grant a patent was exceedingly long,
and while the patent was pending anyone could practice it. Even when patents were
issued, MITI has used its "administrative guidance" to ensure that no Japanese company
that needed a license to a patent would go without one. Needless to say, this compulsory
licensing did not extend to foreign companies, and has been a significant contributor to
the perception of "Japan, Inc." Patents served to protect Japanese companies from
outsiders. The guidance exercised by MITI tended to protect companies in an industry
from excessive competition (even. from Japanese newcomers) and this minimized their
risk. The patents did not, however, offer much, if any, competitive advantage vis-h-vis
Japanese competitors, nor did they tend to promote a high respect for the value a patent
could confer. Copyrights, too, were routinely ignored, so that the piracy of Western
books and manuals as well as recordings was relatively common.
Japanese Legal Environment
A foreigner was and is, of course, free to bring suit in a Japanese court for redress. This,
however, is still not a credible option. Japanese courts are heavily overloaded, but that
doesn't mean they work hard. There are very few lawyers -- less than 10,000, compared
with nearly a million in the US -- and even fewer judges. Whether there are too many
lawyers in the US is irrelevant; in Japan, there are simply not enough to go around. Even
where a suit is brought, the judges emphasize reaching a settlement, regardless of the
balance of equity or law. Cases routinely drag on for years, often ending without a
settlement when one of the parties dies of old age.
Patents and Japanese Multinationals
Nevertheless, Japanese multinationals have accumulated enormous portfolios of Japanese
(and US) patents, at considerable expense. In recent years, the most obvious use of these
portfolios has been defensive. As they expand abroad, these companies are faced with
9
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entrenched local companies, often with strong patent positions of their own. Not only do
they use their patents, properly, to defend their market position; they often assert their
patents against the Japanese companies and demand very high royalty payments. Only by
having a comparable portfolio have the Japanese multinationals been able to expand
affordably abroad.
There are certainly other reasons why a Japanese company may pursue a serious patent
program. As IBM has shown, it makes for good advertising, strengthening the brand
image of a high tech company. Inventing, and analyzing the inventions of others, has
been found to be good for training young engineers, as Fujitsu among others has found.
By sending all of its new engineers to a six month assignment reading, analyzing, and
reporting on new patents in their businesses, Fujitsu is able to educate these new hires in
what is important, who is doing it, and how. Perhaps, too, Japanese companies have been
patenting because "it is what advanced companies do", and when they were prospering,
management did not have to examine the economic justification of its patents too closely.
As a result of all these factors, Japanese companies have a major share of worldwide
patents in businesses in which they have a major share of the business - more than half
the patents in automotive and electrical and electronic fields, less than 10% in
communications, chemicals, drugs, and foodstuffs, and hardly any in space technology.
Now, however, we are seeing changes both at the governmental level and in the
companies themselves, as they attempt to find value in their patents.
In doing so, they find themselves at a distinct disadvantage. Although they have been
engaged in licensing negotiations with major American companies for some time, most
companies relied strongly on MITI and luck and as a consequence few Japanese
companies developed much expertise in licensing. Their periodic meetings with
American companies such as IBM and TI amounted to OJT (on the job training). Much
like today's Internet community, the Japanese companies viewed charging for a patent
license as somehow unfair - either you were in the "Club", and were licensed, or you
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were out. Even today, many mid-size Japanese companies are shocked when an
American company requests payments.
A New Outlook
Nevertheless, CEO's of companies like Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric and Fujitsu are
quoted as putting new emphasis on licensing income. They are shifting their patenting
focus from Japan to the US, where the courts are much more effective. At the same time,
Japan is modifying its patent laws and patent granting procedures to make them - at least
on the surface - more like the rest of the world. What has been a four-year delay in
issuing a patent is to be shortened. Penalties for infringement, formerly barely a slap on
the wrist, are becoming closer to actual damages, although triple damages will not
happen soon.
In another attempt to bring Japanese IP practices up to date, MITI is leading an initiative
to encourage companies to exploit their "sleeping" patents. A sleeping patent is defined
as one that is neither being used nor being licensed, and MITI put a number of 500,000
on those it thought had promise. One might well question this number, of course. Since
so many Japanese companies engage in helter-skelter patenting, it is likely that an
enormous number of Japanese patents are simply worthless. Sleeping, perhaps - but not
worth waking up. On the other hand, this initiative could be a small step in the direction
of licensing "non-core" patents, patents in fields which are not central to the enterprise's
business or strategy. This is, even in the West, still barely a visible trend, but it could
have important bottom line implications if executed well.
Changes Promised in Japanese Universities
Even academia is getting into the act. This would be a near revolution. The accepted
image of Japanese higher education is that students do all the work in getting in to a
selective institution such as Tokyo (National) University or Keio or Waseda (private)
University. Once accepted, students rarely attend class, much less study. Until very
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recently, getting a good job was almost entirely a function of having gotten in to the right
university. Thus, undergraduate education is deplorable. Graduate education is not
notably better. A professorship, like any other job in industrial Japan, is something one
got by seniority. Once having been accepted as an Assistant Professor, one only has to
stay long enough to have an inside shot at a professorship. Outsiders are not recruited, are
rarely considered - even the entry-level faculty positions are filled with alumni who have
already been identified by a professor as a likely successor.
Perhaps needless to say, this culture was not conducive to the creation of valuable
research, much less of valuable patents or copyrights. Japanese companies did and do
virtually all the worthwhile research (and all of the development) in the country. The few
students who are genuinely interested in a graduate education and a research career
almost always go abroad, as evidenced by the careers of nearly all of the relatively few
Japanese Nobel Prize winners. Thus, the sparse patent statistics quoted elsewhere are
only to be expected.
Now, however, the government is taking a few small steps to remedy the situation. They
are even talking about making an undergraduate education meaningful. Actually
accomplishing this, if it is even possible, will take years. In the meantime, a little is
changing. Faculty at national universities can now share in the licensing payments for
their inventions, and major schools like Waseda and Tokyo University are setting up
technology transfer departments. Of course, they have a long way to go. Japanese
universities have only rarely done world-class research, and their patent output is
pathetic. The leading Japanese patenting university (Tokai University, not at the top tier
academically) received only 13 patents in 1997; Tokyo University received only 5. In
contrast, UC received 180; MIT, 108. Thus, unless the faculties recruit research-oriented
staff, who would do valuable research, the chances of much in the way of technology
transfer are small.
Impact of the 1998 Asian Economic Crisis
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A serious case of economic malaise has come to Asia. Japan is in a two-year recession,
and that is the good news. It would be surprising if these events did not affect the IPR
situation. The credit crunch is limiting investment and corporate growth. This might
naturally be expected to promote patent and other licensing as a revenue producer. At the
same time, companies should be more mindful of protecting their IP, thus enhancing IPR
protection. Moreover, if companies are limited in investing in developing new proprietary
IP, they may find it attractive to license existing IP from foreigners. Although requiring a
cash outlay in most cases, the cash would be less than the cost of doing it themselves,
while decreasing time to market in a major way. They will almost certainly be interested
in licensing at least some of their own intellectual property to foreigners for hard
currency.
This is not the whole story, of course. Particularly in Japan and Korea, where "lifetime"
employment is difficult to escape, labor is not a variable expense. Still, a company might
well be inclined to use its existing skilled labor as part or all of the up-front payment for a
license. In such a case, the licensor would get an immediate benefit, in the form of the
non-cash investment needed to commercialize a technology plus the promise of future
royalty payments. Since there will be acute shortages of foreign exchange in most Asian
countries, such a relationship would seem more likely than a simple payment for a
license.
The are also a variety of macroeconomic factors which will tend to favor (or mitigate
against) IP licenses. If local currency has depreciated, local labor and supplies costs will
be low, making indigenous innovation and development advantageous - assuming the
enterprise can remain solvent.
There are also major negative implications for licensing from the Asian crisis. With
business in terrible shape, the risks of being caught infringing another company's patents
may well be viewed as more acceptable. Moreover, the motivation to do so will increase
as money for both development and licensing dries up. Even where a licensee is willing
to pay, he may be unable to do so, and attempt to renegotiate the terms of a license. It is
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still early to tell, but all of the above have been observed at one time in the past few
months.
Government Promotion of IP Generation
Japan has been the leading practitioner of precompetitive industrial cooperative projects.
This system, practiced by MITI and immortalized as "Japan, Inc.", was so popular that
many other countries in Europe and then US, as well as Asia, have emulated it. Of
course, the US had its own brand of government-subsidized R&D, mainly through
defense contracts and also in DoD and Energy Department National Laboratories. The
latter, a $5-6B national resource are, like the Japanese Universities, adding "technology
transfer" to their charters - if not to their great successes, at least not yet. The US has,
moreover, complimented MITI to the extent of trying to make its own version of the
cooperative R&D projects under the rubric of the Advanced Technology Program.
It is not my purpose here to discuss the (lack of) success of the US programs, however,
What many people may not realize is that the MITI enterprise has hardly been a complete
success. Indeed, the only clear success was the semiconductor project - which enabled
the major Japanese high tech companies to catch up with the American leaders and, in
some fields, to take the lead. Virtually all of the successor programs, certainly including
the much advertised "Fifth Generation Computer Project" have led to negligible
commercial technology, and not much more useful research. One possible message from
this experience is that the best judge of a commercially valuable innovation is a company
that is in a position to exploit it. A consortium of companies, each avoiding giving away
any of its best know-how, is hardly likely to pursue a really valuable line of new research.
The reason the semiconductor project succeeded is most likely the fact that there was no
"new" know-how or technology involved; it was more a matter of replicating and
transferring existing know-how from the West. Not that that was necessarily easy; it was,
however, unlikely to put any of the participants in a position where their unique or
proprietary know-how would be endangered.
14
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IPR and "Hollowing"
At the height of the euphoria of the "bubble" economy, many in Japan observed the trend
among US companies - by definition in this case, multinationals - to move their labor-
intensive industry off shore. To the Japanese, this represented a mortgage of the US
industrial birthright. Manufacturing is what makes a company strong, they say, and the
US was getting out of the business. The US economy was becoming "hollow." The US
attitude, of course, was that the US was retaining the high value-add elements of business
such as innovation, design, and development. Moving the low value-add manufacturing
functions to low wage, low tax economies could be seen as good for everyone.
This is certainly debatable, particularly when the low wage economies insist, as a
condition for allowing a foreign presence, that the interlopers also transfer a portion of
the good stuff. Japan, as we saw, did this with IBM in the sixties and seventies, and
everyone else has followed suit. Thus, again taking IBM as an example, IBM Korea
added a development function, and IBM has also installed branches of its prestigious
Research Division in China and India. In a final irony, however, we see Japan, now a first
world economy, exporting its manufacturing to other countries in Asia and Europe, while
the government tries hard to motivate its client companies to lead the way into a
"knowledge society". Of course, this is an economy in which the low value-add
manufacturing jobs are exported, leaving only such high value-add activities as
innovation, design and development.
Protection of IPR is a critical factor in the likely success of an intentional hollowing
strategy. Even low value-add manufacturing often has high IP content such as tooling,
plant layout, testing, and even employee training procedures and manuals. Exposing such
assets to dilution or theft, as is common in many Asian and eastern European countries,
has to be viewed as an added cost of doing business. If the value received in the form of
lower labor costs and taxes (and market access, too) can not compensate for the loss of an
intellectual asset, the enterprise should move elsewhere, if at all. It is an unfortunate fact
that relatively few corporate managers in the US and Europe are sufficiently aware of
15
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these risks, with the likely eventual outcome that they will create strong competitors who
are able to compete because they have access to the Western company's own valuable
intellectual assets.
Even where management recognizes that they may be placing an asset at risk when they
move it into an emerging economy, they often can be satisfied if their employees and
partners in the new country are bound by contracts and licenses. Certainly a contract or
license as only as good as the tradition of a "rule of law." Where other laws - such as
those relating to intellectual property - are routinely flouted, the contracts are rarely
worth the time it takes to negotiate and draft them.
Conclusion
There can be little doubt that in Japan, the "winds of change" are altering the course of
intellectual property rights, almost certainly in the direction of stronger rights for creators
and owners of intellectual property. In consort with this, those owners are clearly
becoming aware of the latent value in their IP assets, particularly their patents, and they
are getting encouragement and material support from the government. It is, however, too
early to say whether these trends will be sufficient to overcome the huge inertia that any
change in the Japanese way of doing business faces.
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